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    The Cost of Prohibition: A GFN 2026 Panel on Tobacco Harm Reduction and Illicit Trade

    July 14, 2026
    The Cost of Prohibition: A GFN 2026 Panel on Tobacco Harm Reduction and Illicit Trade

    Illicit trade: one pattern across many markets

    GFN, now in its thirteenth year, is the main annual meeting on nicotine science and policy. It brings together researchers, clinicians, consumer advocates, regulators, journalists and industry figures for several days of debate.

    The Illicit Trade panel was deliberately mixed: Michael Ellis, a former head of INTERPOL's illicit-trade program; Dorrie Heemskerk of the Dutch vaping retailers' association; Asa Saligupta, a Thai consumer advocate; the Mexican organized-crime journalist Oscar Balderas; and Trevor McGaughey of Philip Morris International (PMI). Different rules in each country, but one recurring pattern: restricting the legal market tends to relocate demand rather than remove it.

    The Netherlands provides a very clear example. Ms Heemskerk described how a strict flavor ban (effective January 2024, limiting e-liquids to tobacco flavors with just 16 permitted ingredients) and an earlier ban on online sales have shrunk the legal vaping market by an estimated 75–80%. And Donkere wolken ("Dark clouds"), a report by the agency Bureau Beke commissioned by the Dutch health ministry and published in April 2026, found that 87% of vapers were using banned products or vapes bought through illegal channels. Mr McGaughey noted that PMI's own research finds similar patterns and dynamics in many other markets around the world where the sale of safer nicotine products is prohibited or subject to overly tight regulation.

    Where prohibition meets organized crime

    The harder edge came from markets with outright bans. In Thailand, where import, sale and distribution are illegal, Mr Saligupta described a black market that has migrated to messaging apps and is awash with counterfeits — some containing etomidate, an anesthetic, and other dangerous ingredients. Official data put the number of Thai vapers at 78,000 in 2021; advocates believe the real figure is 2–3m. A parliamentary committee on which Mr Saligupta served reached consensus to regulate and legalize the market, only for the legislation to stall.

    Mr Balderas was bleaker still. Following Mexico's constitutional ban, his investigative work — drawing on interviews with cartel members — estimates that criminal groups now supply effectively the entire market, which he values at roughly 15bn pesos a year. He described vapes used as a currency, to recruit minors and to extort shopkeepers, moving along the same routes as other trafficking, and had hair-raising accounts of the violence committed by the gangs involved in this trade. Mr Ellis set this in a wider frame: in his experience you cannot enforce your way out of illicit trade, because the demand persists and seizures are often simply restocked. Too often politicians take measures which encourage illicit markets to flourish, then pin the blame on enforcement failings.

    Why this matters

    The thread running through every example is simple. Harm reduction only delivers its public-health benefit if people can actually buy the safer product. When a government bans these products, or regulates them so heavily that the legal market collapses, it does not remove the demand — it removes the choice, and with it the consumer's autonomy to move to something less harmful. Supply passes to sellers with no quality control, no age checks and no tax to pay, and the unintended consequences follow in a familiar order: counterfeit and adulterated products, criminal infiltration, people who smoke drifting back to cigarettes, and enforcement agencies left with the fallout. These are the consequences that Professor Etter set out in his keynote address.

    This isn't an unopposed view. Some public-health bodies, the World Health Organization among them, worry most about youth uptake and favor strict enforcement of bans. But across very different markets — the Netherlands, Thailand, Mexico — the panel's picture was strikingly consistent: the benefits prohibition promises rarely materialize, while the harms it creates reliably do. On the evidence of outcomes rather than intentions, the case is for regulating these products in proportion to their risk, not banning them.

    In the end, a ban cannot make the demand disappear. The people the panel kept in view — adults who smoke, reaching for something safer — will find a seller whatever the law says. The only thing prohibition decides is whether that seller is a licensed retailer or a criminal.

    A video of GFN's Illicit Trade panel is available here.

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